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Calling It a Leg Doesn't Make It a Leg*:
Doctors, Lawyers, and Tort Reform
Ellen Wertheimer**
It is at this point axiomatic that doctors hate lawyers. But
why do doctors hate the legal profession so much?' Many of my
students have medical professionals in their families, and we
reflect together in my Law and Medicine course on why these
relatives hate attorneys so much. It is, of course, true that
lawyers are the instrumentalities of lawsuits against doctors, and
nothing can realistically be done about that. But the hatred
seems to go beyond this. There are several possible explanations,
all of them understandable and, if adequately confronted,
tractable. The remedies may be painful for the legal profession,
but failure to act will allow an untenable set of double standards
to remain intact. This article explores some of the sources in the
law and legal profession for this tension between the legal and
* Abraham Lincoln asked his audience: "If you call a tail a leg, how many legs
has a dog? Four. Calling it a leg doesn't make it a leg." Brainy Quotes,
Abraham Lincoln Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/a/
abrahamlincoln.html (last visited August 10, 2007). So also with tort
reform: calling it tort reform doesn't make it tort reform.
** Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I want to thank Kim
Yuhas, my research assistant, and Amy Spare, a wonderful librarian, for
their help on this article. I also want to thank Sue Small, whose computer
expertise was immeasurably helpful. Most of all, I want to thank Carl Bogus,
the American Association for Justice, and the Roger Williams University
School of Law for their support for this article.
1. See Stephanie Mencimer, Malpractice Makes Perfect: How the GOP
Milks a Phony Doctors' Insurance Crisis, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2003,
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0310.mencim
er.html ("All across the country, doctors ... are telling reporters, legislators,
and even their patients that frivolous lawsuits are driving up insurance costs
and driving doctors out of practice. . . . [D]octors put the blame for their
insurance woes on trial lawyers, malpractice suits, and juries.").
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medical professions and reflects on their significance for true tort
reform.
First, and most potentially painful for the legal profession, the
legal system treats doctors and lawyers differently in the realm of
professional malpractice. As this article will show, the legal
system, populated by attorneys, evinces much greater tolerance
for legal errors than for medical ones. The only cure for this is to
adopt legal reforms that will hold attorneys to the same standards
of care within their profession that doctors are required to meet in
theirs.
Second, doctors believe that the tort system is responsible for
the high legal costs of practicing medicine and for the high
insurance premiums that they presume result from these costs.
This has led to two problems. The first is the blame attached to
the tort system by the medical profession, which is
understandable in light of the false premise that lawyers, through
the tort system, cause high insurance premiums. The second is
likewise based on the inaccuracy of the premise. Efforts at tort
reform, promulgated by law-dominated legislatures, inevitably fail
to fix the problem of high premiums because the tort system is not
wholly responsible for those high premiums. The fact that
premiums stay high continues to be blamed on the tort system,
and the failures of tort reform to remedy this simply allow the
bitterness to remain. Of course, tort reform cannot fix the
problem, but that is because it is not the tort system that caused it
in the first place. Calling it tort reform does not make it serve as
true reform, because the laws that are enacted are aimed at the
wrong target. Indeed, calling it tort reform may itself be harmful,
because it causes doctors to hope, a hope that is groundless and
leads to further feelings of betrayal by a legal system that seems
to doctors to cause them nothing but harm. If premiums do not go
down when judgment awards decline (if they in fact do so after the
reforms are enacted), it means that insurance companies are
using premiums for purposes other than paying claims. The cure
for this source of the problem is to enact genuine tort reform,
which will require legislatures to regulate the insurance industry
more effectively.
Lawyers, trained to objectivize their cases, fail to take into
account the extent to which being sued is personal to the
defendant in all cases, but perhaps most of all in medical
156 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:154
malpractice cases where the defendant's professional identity is
under attack. Attorneys, whose exercise of professional judgment
is much more rarely challenged, cannot share this traumatic
experience with doctors.
This article contains two parts. In the first part, the article
discusses and documents the contrasting treatment the tort
system gives to doctors and lawyers, and the ways in which the
tort system has developed to cause doctors the maximum in
professional angst. The legal profession judges doctors; doctors
get no opportunity to judge lawyers. Indeed, lawyers, through the
legal system, judge themselves. This in itself could explain the
particularly vituperative dislike doctors feel for lawyers. But
there is more. In Part II, the article turns to the tort reforms that
have been and are being enacted, allegedly to remedy the
perceived problems in the tort system. None of these has proven
successful, which in itself further fuels the fire of physician
hatred, because lawyers are blamed both for the problems doctors
confront and for the failure to fix them. The article concludes with
several suggestions for the form that true tort reform, aimed both
at the dissonance between the legal and medical professions and
at tort judgments, might take.
I. DOCTORS V. LAWYERS
A. Doctors as Defendants
First, why do doctors hate the legal system-and lawyers-so
much? I believe that there are many reasons besides the obvious
one that doctors get sued. After all, lawyers get sued, too. They
don't hate the system, although they may hate individual
practitioners. Indeed, many businesses also get sued regularly,
but they seem better able to take the challenge of litigation more
or less in stride. In any event, the axiomatic hatred of doctors for
lawyers does not appear in any other context. The generalized
hatred felt by doctors for the legal profession seems to go beyond
what one might normally expect. The following turns to some of
the possible sources for this hatred.
1. Judges are Lawyers and Patients, Too
One source of hatred seems to be the view that those who file
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and adjudicate cases are abysmally ignorant of the medical
profession. This view may well be accurate, because the decision-
makers in medical malpractice cases are lawyers and juries, and
not doctors. This in itself would be enough to produce anger, but
our society adds jealousy to the anger by also using lawyers to
judge cases against lawyers. The differences in case results that
this can produce can be both conspicuous and infuriating-if one
happens to be a doctor. I believe that the primary reason for this
is that the lawyer defendants have the immense advantage of a
built-in sympathetic expert witness on the bench. This built-in
empathy is reflected in the prevailing standards for attorney
malpractice. The judge knows how complicated law is, how hard
it is to predict what juries will do, and how pressured the life of an
attorney is. Take, for example, the case of Lucas v. Hamm2, a
classic chestnut read by most first year law students. In that
case, an attorney made a very serious mistake on a will, and the
person who should have inherited, but did not, sued him.3 The
judge decided that the plaintiff could sue the attorney for the
deceased, despite the absence of a relationship between the would-
be heir and the attorney, but that the plaintiff should lose as a
matter of law, because the mistake was with respect to the rule
against perpetuities, and no one understands the rule against
perpetuities. 4 The court reflected:
Of the California law on perpetuities and restraints it has
been said that few, if any, areas of the law have been
fraught with more confusion or concealed more traps for
the unwary draftsman .... [A]n attorney of ordinary skill
acting under the same circumstances might well have
'fallen into the net which the rule spreads for the unwary'
and failed to recognize the danger .... [A]n error of the
type relied on by the plaintiffs does not show negligence
or breach of contract on the part of the defendant.
5
The lawyer, therefore, was reasonable in making a colossal
mistake that invalidated the intended inheritance. 6 Can you
2. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
3. Id. at 686.
4. Id. at 690.
5. Id.
6. See also Gimbel v. Waldman, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
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imagine a similar result or statement in a medical malpractice
case? A judge saying, "yes, you made a mistake, you were even
negligent, but no one really understands how the brain works so
don't worry about it?"
The professional empathy that is built in to the attorney
malpractice standards is wholly absent from the field of medical
malpractice. Research reveals that medical malpractice cases are
vastly more common than legal malpractice cases.7 They are
certainly more widely discussed in the media. Legal malpractice
cases and issues maintain a much lower profile. While that may
be because no one feels any urge to protect attorneys from being
sued, it seems unlikely. It is far more likely that the answer lies
in the fact that medical malpractice cases are vastly more
frequent, demonstrated by their inarguably greater impact on
daily life. It also seems clear that more mistakes are considered
reasonable when lawyers commit them than when doctors do. I
find it hard to imagine that the discrepancy between legal and
medical malpractice cases has its source in any real differences
between the quality of practice in the two professions. It must lie
in the fact that judges have a greater understanding of and
tolerance for legal mistakes than for medical ones. Indeed, the
attorney's duty to the client to investigate other avenues of
pursuit, such as insurance, has been interpreted narrowly.8
Judges can imagine themselves in the attorney-defendant's shoes
and can sympathize with the challenges of practicing law. But in
a medical malpractice case, their empathy is more likely to be
personal than professional. They envision themselves not as
doctors but as patients, and in the plaintiffs position. They want
everything from the medical profession that the plaintiff wants.
Another problem lies in the phenomenon of the lawsuit itself.
Attorneys are taught to be disinterested, objectively pursuing
their clients' interests without emotion. It is all too easy to forget
that being sued is personal to the doctors who are defendants. It
is easy to convince an attorney representing one of the parties-
and the insurance company covering the doctor-that a settlement
("No attorney is bound to know all the law.").
7. In fact, legal malpractice cases that are at all analogous to medical
malpractice cases are extremely difficult to find.
8. See A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No
More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 14-15 (2004).
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makes economic sense, because it will be more expensive to
litigate the case than to pay off the plaintiff. Most insurance
companies, not the doctors, control this decision as a matter of
contract. 9 It is one thing to do a cost benefit analysis on litigating
a case when one is not personally invested in the suit; it is quite
another for the doctor to understand why his or her insurance
company would settle without the doctor's agreement and in the
face of the doctor's strong feeling that the settlement is
tantamount to telling the doctor that he or she did something
wrong. In this context all the lawyers, even the lawyers ostensibly
representing the doctor's interests, seem to side against the
doctor. The doctor's professional identity is under attack from all
sides.
2. The Doctor as Victim in the Informed Consent Context
Another set of issues arises in the context of the contrast
between the decision-making power given by the law to the
patient and to the client. The rules applicable to legal practice
allow clients to make fundamental decisions, such as whether to
settle or how to plead. But the decisions on how to conduct the
case are up to the attorney, and not the client. 10 A client may
wish for a case to take a certain form, or may be opposed to calling
a particular witness, but the extent to which the client actually
9. PETER P. BUDETTI & TERESA M. WATERS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw
IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (May 2005), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upl
oadfMedical-Malpractice-Law-in-the-United-States-Report.pdf ("[Pihysicians
feel that the high costs of defending lawsuits ha[ve] generated a likelihood
that their own malpractice insurance company will 'reward' and indeed
encourage non-meritorious lawsuits by settling them when the insurer thinks
settlement would be less costly than defending the case.").
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule-1_2.html. The relevant text of the rule
reads:
(a) [A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and ... shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide
by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the
client will testify.
160 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:154
controls these decisions is limited. "Good faith tactical decisions
or decisions made on a fairly debatable point of law are generally
not actionable under the rule of judgmental immunity."'1
Attorneys cannot be placed in the position of having to accept
direction from clients on intricate interpretations of the correct of
current state of the law. The attorney, not the client, is the
individual trained to interpret the law. This does not mean that
an attorney should never be required to inform a client regarding
a conflict in the law; however, when an interpretation has been
made as to the state of the law in a given district and that
interpretation has a proper basis of support, an attorney should
not be required to compromise a reasoned judgment by having to
factor into the judgment the client's reasoning on a fine point of
law.1 2
It is perhaps worth noting that the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require that the attorney "consult" with the
client as to the means to be used to achieve the goals of the
lawsuit, but conspicuously do not require that the attorney comply
with the client. The list of areas of client control-whether to
settle, plead, waive a jury trial, or testify-tends to be treated as
exclusive, with the attorney in charge of all else.
In medicine, however, the doctrine of informed consent1 3 gives
considerably more power to the patient than the law gives to
clients. Clearly, the law, made by lawyers, recognizes that clients
do not have the knowledge to make the kinds of decisions that the
law is content to leave to attorneys. Patients are at least as
ignorant of medicine as clients are of the law, however, so the
refusal to impose analogous obligations on attorneys to those
imposed on doctors can only proceed from a sense in the legal
profession that law is different in some way. This is where the
fact that those who create the obligations are themselves
attorneys comes in. They have an appreciation for the
11. Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1998).
12. Id. at 1359.
13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The
context in which the duty of risk-disclosure arises is invariably the occasion
for decision as to whether a particular treatment procedure is to be
undertaken. To the physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying
evaluation, the answer may seem clear, but it is the prerogative of the
patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his
interests seem to lie.").
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complexities of their own profession, and not for the challenges of
others, particularly because they are themselves in the patient
role. Thus, attorneys, including judges, empathize with patients
in the doctor/patient context, and with the lawyer in the
attorney/client relationship. In a legal malpractice case, all the
attorneys share a common language and a common fear that one
day they too could be in the defendant's role. As one commentator
observed, "the doctrine of informed consent has not received a
warm welcome in legal malpractice cases."
14
In the medical malpractice field, widespread recognition of the
doctrine of informed consent has increased the disclosure
obligations of physicians. A medical professional, absent special
circumstances, must disclose all material risks of, and alternatives
to, a course of treatment, regardless of what is customary among
professionals practicing in the community. The informed-consent
doctrine has not yet found equally clear recognition in the legal
malpractice field, although there is good authority that the same
principles apply as readily in law as in medicine.
15
Doctors understandably feel that patients are at least as
ignorant of medicine as clients are of law, but the law gives to
patients a far greater say in their treatment than it gives to
clients with respect to their cases. There is no reason why, in
theory, informed consent doctrine should not apply equally to the
legal and medical professions. The only explanation I can think of
for this phenomenon is that the lawyers make the rules. At worst,
they have no interest in giving clients more power than they
already have; at best, they recognize the complexities of the law
and genuinely believe that clients cannot be sufficiently educated
to make reasonable decisions about their cases. Either way, the
law of informed consent suffers because attorneys make it. The
paternalistic approach that lawyers take to client decision-making
is thoroughly rejected in the context of patient decision-making, in
the glaring absence of any explanation as to why medicine is
easier to explain to patients than law is to clients.
This is not to say that informed consent is a bad doctrine. In
fact, informed consent is a vital doctrine, a testament to the view
14. Oddi, supra note 8, at 18.
15. Vincent R. Johnson, 'Absolute and Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 737, 749 (2003), quoted in Oddi, supra note 8, at 18 n.105.
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that people are autonomous and that certain decisions should be
left to the individual to make. It is only to point out that it is not
applied evenhandedly to attorneys and doctors. Attorneys are
given far more power over how a case is conducted than doctors,
and are found liable far less frequently for violating the applicable
standards. To win an informed consent case in the legal
malpractice arena, the client must prove that the case would have
turned out differently had the client's input been taken
seriously. 16 This is almost impossible to prove. This contrasts
sharply with the standard for informed consent in medical
malpractice cases, where the client must simply prove that he or
she would have made a different decision had the physician
provided the required information. 17  While these cases are
difficult to prove as well, the difference between proving that the
case would have had a different result and that the patient would
have made a different decision seems vast. Attorneys will only be
liable for professional malpractice in the most egregious cases.
3. Doctors and Hindsight
The law is also much more willing to second-guess doctors
than lawyers. Whether a decision was the right one to make at
the time it was made is frequently the subject of malpractice suits.
The comparable legal malpractice suit will be vastly more difficult
to win, as the courts are more comfortable with lack of certainty in
the legal profession than they are in the medical. Of course,
judges are patients. It is impossible to keep this fact from spilling
over into the decision-making process. I am sure that lawyers, as
patients, would very much like medicine to be a more certain
science than it is, and their view that it should be cannot help but
have an impact upon their view of medical malpractice. Probably
16. John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the
Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1130
(1988) ("The client must establish . . . that the lawyer's breach of duty was
the cause in fact of the client's loss .... The loss of the claim should be
sufficient to establish that the client suffered a legal wrong as a result of the
attorney's negligence. The trial within a trial method, however, requires
proof that the trial of the underlying claims would ultimately have resulted
in a verdict for the client.").
17. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 ("A causal connection exists when,
but only when, disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would
have resulted in a decision against it.").
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because they understand their own profession, courts are more
tolerant of unpredictability in the legal arena than in the medical
one. When a case turns out badly, the court will refer to the
truism that juries and/or the law itself are notoriously
unpredictable, and it is not the attorney's fault.
As one commentator noted, "[a] legal malpractice action is
unlikely to succeed when the attorney erred because an issue of
law was unsettled or debatable. The perfect vision and wisdom of
hindsight is an unreliable test for determining the past existence
of legal malpractice." Because plaintiff (in the countersuit) acted
in a manner that was reasonable and consistent with the law as it
existed at the time of representation, it had no duty to inform
defendants about possible "advertising liability" insurance
coverage for their patent infringement litigation expenses.
18
Some courts have gone further:
Under the venerable error-in-judgment rule, if an
attorney acting in good faith exercises an honest and
informed discretion in providing professional advice, the
failure to anticipate correctly the resolution of an
unsettled legal principle does not constitute culpable
conduct. To require the attorney to further advise a
client of the uncertainty in the law would render the
exercise of such professional judgment meaningless. 19
In other words, attorneys are not liable for failing to inform
their clients about uncertainty in the legal issues confronting
them. When did you last see an analogous analysis of a medical
result? Courts have been willing to hold doctors liable for failing
to inform patients that a proposed treatment is experimental or
uncertain of success. 20 Because judges are patients, they want
from the medical system the same certainty that patients in
general want. They do not demand it from the legal profession
because they know it cannot be had.
18. Darby & Darby v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 739 N.E.2d 744, 748 (N.Y. 2000)
(citations omitted); but see Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Mass. 1996)
("The absence of a guarantee does not, however, foreclose liability for the
adverse consequences of a negligent failure to advise a client of the
uncertainty of the advice given.").
19. Davis v. Damrell, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260-61 (Ct. App. 1981).
20. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1974) (court did not
dismiss case based on medical experimentation for failure to state a claim).
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The case of In re AC 21 provides a sad but powerful example of
another aspect of this phenomenon. Courts are clearly unwilling
to second-guess attorneys in the context of legal malpractice. 22
They are far more willing to second guess medical decisions made
by doctors and those few medical decisions made by trial judges
who are actually present on the scene of the crisis. In In re AC,
the appellate court seemed sure about what AC wanted-in a
situation where the doctors and the trial judge, who were there,
were not. Usually, the judge is not in the same room as the
patient, and is not exposed to the tragedy and uncertainty that
presence brings. Surrounded by weeping people, dealing with an
imminent death perhaps of AC and of her child, the judge does the
best he or she can-and then gets shot down by the appellate
court. This highlights the problem with adjudicating these cases
in the quiet of the courtroom-a problem that applies equally to
all judges, who do not see the turmoil that lies behind the
decision. This has its positive attributes-it allows judges to set
rules of decision at a time when they can think about what they
are doing-but it is problematic if it leads to a lack of
comprehension of the realities of medical practice. 23 When the
judges are in the hospital rooms, the results often look quite
different from cases when they are not.
Unlike many of my fellow academics and attorneys, I have
never joined the crowd ridiculing the famous or infamous
Georgetown24 decision. It is all too easy to deride Judge Skelly
Wright as an interfering do-gooder in ordering a blood transfusion
for a young woman who, competently and coherently, refused to
21. In re AC, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). In this case, the pregnant
woman, who desperately wanted her child, faced imminent death from
cancer. Id. at 1238. The question was whether to perform an emergency
caesarean section to deliver her child, which might accelerate her death but
save the child, or wait to do so. Id. at 1238-39. The trial court, present in the
hospital, ordered the caesarean based at least in part on the impossibility of
ascertaining what her wishes were. Id. at 1240. Tragically, both the woman
and her child died. Id. at 1241. The appellate court, apparently confident
that the mother had rejected the surgery, reversed. Id. at 1253.
22. See Darby & Darby, 739 N.E.2d at 748.
23. See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965) for an example
of this phenomenon.
24. In re President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), reh'g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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have one despite the risk that she would die.25 I picture the judge
in the hospital room, with an order thrust in front of him, being
told "If you sign it, she lives. If you don't sign it, she dies." We
may all agree in the light of hindsight that he should not have
signed the order, but we also need to think about the situation in
which he found himself, the power of life and death in his hands.
We need to forgive him for his act in coming up with what (again
in hindsight) look like weak excuses for signing the order. To be
honest, in the same situation, I am not sure I would have had the
fortitude not to sign, especially in the dawn of the right to refuse
life-saving treatment. What this case highlights for me is the
difficulty of making decisions in life-and-death emergency
contexts. Courts, especially appellate courts, see these decisions
in the calm light after the emergency has passed and show no
understanding for the conditions under which the decision was
made. 26 While this fact has its utility, in that the appellate courts
can proclaim the standard of conduct for the future, it can seem
uncomprehending as well. One of the lessons these cases can
teach us is that it can be very difficult to reach a clearly mandated
result. In other words, the medical facts are messier and the
situations more intractable than the law would like them to be.
While it is outside the scope of this article, it would be interesting
to examine whether the medical malpractice opinions of judges
who themselves have been in the emergency rooms forced to make
a decision undergo any change as a result of that experience.
In later cases, courts have tended to allow the patient to
refuse blood transfusions, even when doctors swore that death was
imminent.27 These cases provide a look at the difference between
the hindsight approach of the typical lawsuit and the uncertainty
of the doctor's world. The opinions justifying the courts' refusals
to authorize involuntary transfusions are, of course, written after
the crisis has resolved itself and in the peace of the judicial
chambers. Snide footnotes appear in many of them to the effect
25. Id.
26. It is worth noting that the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in denying rehearing, made it clear that its decision was
"not necessarily to be taken as approving the action of... [the] judge in the
matter sought to be reheard." Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1010.
27. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (state not
justified in ordering blood transfusion against patient's religious beliefs).
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that the patient survived without the transfusion, impliedly
ridiculing the medical profession when their sworn view that the
patient was about to die proved incorrect.28 Were the doctors
lying when they predicted certain death without a transfusion?
No-they were just uncertain. But the legal system, which cannot
deal with uncertainties of prediction in the medical world, itself
probably forced them to sound more emphatic than they might
have done had they been talking with another doctor, for example.
Yet another permutation of this problem appears in a case
called In re Quackenbush.29 In that case, the judge held that
Quackenbush was mentally competent to refuse life-saving
medical treatment, stating that "I visited with Quackenbush for
about ten minutes. . . . During that period . . . he seemed
reasonably alert. ''30 Based on this ten minute conversation with
the patient, the judge reached the conclusion that the patient was
sufficiently coherent and competent to have his refusal of life-
saving surgery upheld by the court.31 In this case, the judge
reached a combined legal and medical conclusion in a situation
that the doctors had been unable to resolve. While it is perfectly
true that someone had to take a stand on the issue, and that the
judge was, like Judge Wright, landed with this role, it might
nonetheless be offensive to a lawyer if a doctor acted in a similar
manner, assuming an expertise about the legal profession (after
ten minutes' study) that the doctor could not possibly possess.
Hindsight can be a positive force, but it can also be a negative
one. I have never seen a comparable reference in a legal
malpractice opinion that would call attention to the fact that the
attorney had been wrong in his or her predictions about future
events. While it is of course an excellent result if the patient
survives without the transfusion that the doctors believed was
necessary, it does not mean that the doctors were wrong at the
time of their prediction or that they exaggerated the dire nature of
the patient's situation. Their ability to predict the future course of
events is limited. Courts often seem unable, however, to tell
28. See id. at 376 n.6 ("We are also advised that the patient has
recovered though his chances were very slim and that he has been discharged
from the hospital.").
29. In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 785 (N.J. Morris County Ct. 1978).
30. Quackenbush, 383 A.2d at 787-88.
31. Id. at 788, 790.
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hindsight from foresight.
4. Medicine as a Science: Sometimes There Is a Right or Wrong
Answer
From the start of my teaching career, I have had fascinating
conversations with doctors who happen to have entered law
school. They often express frustration with the medical
malpractice cases that we study, but the frustration often comes
from a surprising direction. The doctors, quite simply, point out
that what were found as "facts" by the court could not have
happened. Sometimes the "findings" favor plaintiffs, sometimes
they favor defendants. But in either case, what triggers the
frustration is not so much the outcome of the case as the distance
between the judicially determined "facts" of the record and what
my doctor students know to be scientific reality. In other words,
someone has made a mistake along the line somewhere, leading to
a result that makes no scientific sense.
In one of the cases, for example, Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories,32 the defendant drug company (and, a fortiori, the
dentist who prescribed the drug33) won on the ground that the
risks of the drug were not known, and thus could not have been
included in a warning or taken into account by the dentist in
prescribing the drug.34 One of my medically-trained students
demonstrated that this result is indefensible, given what was
known about doxycycline at the time that the drug was prescribed.
It turns out that the risk that the drug would cause tooth
problems if it was ingested by someone whose permanent teeth
were as yet unformed was widely known. Given that the
defendant won that case on the ground that the risk was
unknown, someone made a mistake along the way somewhere and
generated a decision that is individually wrong on the true facts
as opposed to the record and legally indefensible. 35
32. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
33. The dentist, who was also the father of the plaintiff, was not sued in
this case. If he had been, he would have prevailed on the same ground as the
manufacturer: that the risk was not known. See id. at 376-77.
34. Id. at 376, 387 (no liability for failing to warn of unknowable
dangers).
35. In Feldman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey abandoned the
Beshada rule that knowability of a danger was not relevant in strict products
168 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:154
Of course, one can try to defend this result as one of the
inevitable mistakes made by the adversary system, or by the
attorneys who practice it, but that seems to miss the point. We
could have a system that made such mistakes less likely and finds
facts more reliably. Of course, that may lead to more decisions
against doctors, but it would at least be more scientifically
defensible.
5. Doctor as Professionals
As health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have become
common, cases analyzing them make it clear, at least by
implication, that the law has a low opinion of doctors' ethics.
HMO policies are upheld as providing a necessary check on
doctors' perceived tendency to recommend unnecessary and
excessive treatment, a product of the conflict of interest inherent
in the idea that no treatment means that doctors do not get paid.
In Pegram v. Herdrich36, for example, the Supreme Court of the
United States referred to the need for HMOs as a cost cutting
mechanism to discourage treatment and to counteract the conflict
of interest inherent in the medical decision-making process.
HMOs became popular because fee-for-service physicians
were thought to be providing unnecessary or useless services;
today, many doctors and other observers argue that HMOs often
ignore the individual needs of a patient in order to improve the
HMOs' bottom lines. Although it is true that the relationship
between sparing medical treatment and physician reward is not a
subtle one . . . no HMO organization could survive without some
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing. 3
7
If a doctor does not treat, he or she does not get paid. Thus,
an incentive system whereby doctors will get paid more if they do
not treat is necessary. I have not succeeded in finding a case that
says anything similar about attorneys who suffer from the
identical conflict: no lawsuit, no payment, or less, anyway.
liability cases, and instead held that manufacturers could not be liable for
failing to warn of unknowable dangers. See id. at 387-88; Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982). Given that the danger
in Feldman was knowable, the opinion makes even less sense. See Feldman,
479 A.2d at 392-93.
36. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
37. Id. at 220.
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Moreover, if a doctor needed not to treat in order to get paid, it
would seem that the identical conflict of interest would exist, in
this case leading to profit-motivated decisions to forego treatment,
based on the assumption that doctors are too unprofessional to put
their patients' interests ahead of their own. The implication that
doctors need a system to curb their greed, which would otherwise
cause them to recommend treatments that their patients do not
need, is insulting. Like lawyers, doctors are professionals
obligated to put their patients' interests above their own. The
accusation that doctors are incapable of fulfilling this obligation,
and thus need HMOs to govern them, amounts to hypocrisy. 38 It
is perhaps worth pointing out that it is lawyers, in the form of
judges, who are making these implicit accusations.
Thus, doctors see lawyers as blind to their profession's ethical
issues. As the court pointed out in Wickline v. State39 and
Pegram4 ° , doctors are viewed as having a built in conflict of
interest. If the surgeon doesn't operate, he or she doesn't get paid.
In the Wickline case, the court used this conflict as a justification
for a health care insurance/delivery system that encouraged less
medical care and provided an incentive for doctors to provide less
care.41 The entire phenomenon of the HMO was built around the
idea that doctors needed a financial disincentive to providing
treatment. This legal construct is downright insulting, implying
as it does that doctors cannot be trusted to put patients' interests
ahead of their own. The HMO rests on the premise that doctors
will fall victim to their own greed and recommend treatments that
patients don't need in order to make money. The HMO provides a
financial disincentive to force doctors not to fall victim to this
conflict. Have you ever heard of an attorney accepting a scheme
that provides a disincentive to providing legal advice and action? I
was fascinated when, in the early days of medical malpractice
reform, the defense bar opposed compulsory arbitration laws. 42
38. The one situation in which at least some lawyers are willing to
consider the possibility of attorneys being motivated by profits is the
contingent fee context. But even in this situation, the attitude of the legal
profession towards its own motivations is not comparable to its willingness to
condemn doctors wholesale.
39. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986).
40. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229.
41. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
42. See Lauren R. Reskin, Lawyers Oppose Medical Malpractice Bill, 71
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The plaintiffs bar understandably did, but the defense bar? Their
clients favored such legislation, but the defense bar did not. The
only reason I can think of for this opposition is that the defense
bar gets paid by the hour.
In any event, the legal profession buys into the idea that
doctors require anti-treatment incentives to counterbalance their
inevitable conflict of interest, but there is no shortage of attorneys
willing to take on frivolous lawsuits. Clearly the legal profession
does not buy into the idea that it has a beam in its own eye.43
With respect to payment for medical services, courts are
perfectly content to hold that doctors must provide treatment even
if they are not going to get paid for it. While the opinions may not
explicitly say this, by a process of elimination it must be true. It is
malpractice to discharge a patient from the hospital before the
doctor feels it is appropriate to do so, whether the HMO has
agreed to pay for the treatment or not.44 Even if the HMO refuses
to pay for the treatment, the doctor cannot discharge the patient.
The costs of the hospitalization and the physician's treatment
must fall somewhere. If the patient has no resources and the
HMO refuses to pay, the hospital may well end up covering the
cost of the hospitalization, and the doctor may go unpaid. 45
Moreover, if the doctor discharges the patient, he or she is guilty
of malpractice and potentially liable for damages, even if the HMO
has refused to pay for additional treatment. While "cost
consciousness has become a permanent feature of the health care
system, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be
permitted to corrupt medical judgment. ''46 This is all very well
and good, but if there is no way to sue the HMO for failure to pay
for needed treatment, a gap in responsibility that has been created
A.B.A.J. 40 (1985) (only one-third of defense attorneys support bill allowing
doctors and hospitals to make settlement offers within 180 days of a medical
malpractice claim).
43. Matthew 7:3 (King James) ("And why beholdest thou the mote that is
in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?")
44. See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (noting that a "physician who
complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor,
when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate
responsibility for his patient's care.").
45. The process of elimination leads to this conclusion. See, e.g., Muse v.
Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995).
46. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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by the Supreme Court's interpretations of ERISA,47 then there is
no way for the hospital and doctor to be paid for their services. I
have been unable to find a decision requiring that lawyers provide
free service in similar circumstances, where the relationship
began with the expectation that the lawyer would be paid for his
or her services. Of course attorneys supply legal services to the
indigent, but through publicly or privately funded defender or
other organizations, where lawyers usually do get paid, and there
is no expectation from the start that the attorney will be paid by
the client. It is also true that an attorney may not withdraw from
representation without giving the client a chance to find a
replacement, a rule which applies to doctors as well, but that is a
far cry from the situation in which the professional must supply
services whether he or she is going to get paid or not.
B. Doctors as Scientists
1. The Standard of Care
Yet another issue crops up in the context of the standard of
care. In Helling v. Carey48, the court concluded that the
defendant ophthalmologists had been negligent in failing to test
the patient for glaucoma as a matter of law, despite a jury verdict
that they had met the standard of care of a reasonable physician
in the circumstances. The court stated:
[T]he standard of the profession of ophthalmology . . .
does not require the giving of a routine pressure test to
persons under 40 years of age. . . . [H]owever, [t]he
precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of
glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so
imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the
standards of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty
of the courts to say what is required to protect patients
under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma. 49
The court in Helling thus decided that the standard of care of
47. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (claim that
denial of benefits from an employee benefit health plan is pre-empted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)).
48. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
49. Helling, 519 P.2d at 982-83.
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the profession before it was fatally flawed, and replaced the
medical evidence with its own conclusion about what constituted
the appropriate practice. I can find no comparable legal
malpractice case in which the court ruled that the lawyer had
been negligent as a matter of law after the jury had decided that
the standard of care-evidenced by peer testimony-had been
met. The jury in Helling concluded that the defendants had not
been negligent in failing to administer a glaucoma test to the
plaintiff; a fortiori the defendants had not been negligent in failing
to recognize symptoms that would have indicated the need for
such a test.50 The Supreme Court of Washington, in its reversal of
this jury verdict, left ophthalmologists in Washington no choice
but to give such tests to any patient who walks in the door. While
the court tried to pretend that this was not the result, it clearly
was. The jury found as facts that the doctors had not been
negligent in failing to recognize glaucoma and in failing to
administer a glaucoma test. Thus, the ruling that they had been
negligent in failing to give the test as a matter of law meant that
they were not entitled to the reasonable use of their medical
judgment in deciding whether to administer the test.
After Helling was decided, the Washington legislature
enacted a statute that codified the standard of care for medical
professionals as follows: "the plaintiff in order to prevail shall be
required to prove . . . that the defendant or defendants failed to
exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed at that
time by other persons in the same profession. . ."5 This statute
clearly intended to establish a rule that, contrary to Helling,
would permit liability for malpractice if, and only if, the defendant
had failed to act as a reasonable medical professional in the
circumstances. The Supreme Court of Washington, in Gates v.
Jensen,52 however, stood by its decision in Helling, holding that
"[tihe doctrine of Helling v. Carey, that reasonable prudence may
require a higher standard of care [than the applicable professional
standard of care] applies."53 The court discounted the statutory
language that apparently forbade this result on the ground that
50. So much for the idea, beloved of tort reformers, that juries always
decide in favor of the plaintiff.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1995).
52. Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979) (en banc).
53. Id. at 924.
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the statute used the word "possessed," a broader term (in the
court's view) than the concept of the reasonable professional
standard of care.
The statute as passed requires physicians to exercise the skill,
care and learning possessed by others in the same profession.
This standard . . . allows ample scope for the application of the
limited Helling rule. It is not argued that respondent and other
ophthalmologists did not possess the skill, care and learning
required to choose and administer the two [glaucoma] tests. 54
Not surprisingly, a vigorous dissent argued that the statute
was enacted with the intent of replacing Helling with a
professional standard of care.
This case reflects judicial willingness to reject the reasonable
doctor standard in the face of the judges' own assessments that
the doctors were negligent. In other words, under Helling and
Gates a doctor who complied with the standard of care of a
reasonable doctor in the circumstances could be found negligent if
the court viewed the conduct as having been negligent under some
judge-made (and scientifically unsupported) standard. It is
impossible to imagine an equivalent decision in the context of
legal malpractice, in which the court would find the defendant
attorney liable after the jury had decided he or she had acted
reasonably. The very impossibility of this result is underlined by
the ineffective assistance of counsel lines of cases. In criminal
cases, attorneys can sleep through trials,55 do no investigation,
56
call no witnesses 57-all without the courts being willing to label
them as incompetent. Doctors are permitted no such leeway when
they practice their profession. 58
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that defense counsel sleeping through a criminal trial is not a deprivation of
effective assistance of counsel).
56. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 1933 (2007)
(holding that defense counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence for
the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, in which the defendant was given
the death penalty, is not a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel).
57. Id.
58. While it is true that the Helling decision is atypical, the fact that it
existed, and led to the Gates decision, is itself significant.
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2. The Problem of Prediction in Medicine
What may appear to be a semantic difference in language
between law and medicine takes on a much greater and more
intractable guise when it is examined closely. A college friend of
mine reflected on this, many years ago. A psychologist, she was
often called as an expert witness in child custody cases. The
attorney-or sometimes the judge-would ask her if the parent at
issue would be a "good parent." The court needs an answer to this
as part of the decision-making process on custody. However, no
psychologist can possibly answer that question in the form that
the court wants it answered because there are too many
variables-income, other support, school system, etc. This
problem recurs in medical malpractice cases all the time. The
courts want an ANSWER, not an equivocal maybe. But scientists
do not think that way, and cannot reliably answer a question that
way-"[u]ncertainty permeates modern medicine. '59 The concept
of definite and percentage-based predictions is not one that a
medical person can effectively handle. This goes well beyond
vocabulary and into the essential attributes of the two professions.
An expert witness who is forced to answer the question in a way
that the courts can process is being required to betray the values
and thought-processes of the medical profession. It is up to the
law to change: we cannot change science, so the law must develop
to make medical malpractice work.
Another set of recurring problems centers around vocabulary:
the legal understandings of the scientific use of the terms
"experiment," "innovation," and "mistake." To begin with the last
in the series, doctors often make mistakes. It does not follow from
this that the doctor was negligent: there are mistakes that a
reasonable doctor would make, even acting reasonably. 60 This
59. Nancy K. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special
Problems, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 67, 69 (1987).
60. There may well be more than one treatment of choice in a particular
situation, in which case it is not negligent to prefer one over the other, unless
a reasonable doctor could not have selected the particular option. This is the
concept behind the differing schools of thought doctrine. See Parris v. Sands,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800, 803-04 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that proper jury
instruction for medical malpractice cases includes: "Where there is more than
one recognized method of diagnosis or treatment, and no one of them is used
exclusively and uniformly by all practitioners of good standing, a physician is
not negligent if, in exercising his or her best judgment, he or she selects one
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ineluctable fact has produced the so-called honest error in
judgment doctrine, pursuant to which the courts attempt to deal
with the fact that not all medical mistakes are produced by
negligence. 61 This doctrine would be unnecessary if courts would
insist on evidence of negligence and would differentiate between
negligent and non-negligent mistakes.
Similarly, something that a doctor might say was
experimental within the meaning given to the word in the medical
arena might or not be experimental within the meaning of the
word in the legal context. Therapeutic innovation-the use of an
off-label drug or a treatment altered to fit the circumstances-is
not an experiment in the Frankensteinian sense of the term. The
doctor is trying to treat the patient, not to generate information.
The law, in its inability to tell the two kinds of situation apart,
has caused tremendous difficulties for the medical profession. As
one court pointed out: "[t]oo often courts have confused
judgmental decisions and experimentation. Therapeutic
innovation has long been recognized as permissible to avoid
serious consequences." 62 The medical profession might consider a
treatment decision to be a therapeutic one, but nonetheless call it
an experiment. Courts and juries cannot understand this use of
the term, tending to associate experiments with guinea pigs and
not patients.
II. WHY TORT REFORM DOES NOT WORK
Periodically, those in favor of reducing the perceived burden
of malpractice litigation on doctors have attempted, through
statutes, to change medical malpractice law. Back in the 1980s,
"tort reform" took on a specific meaning: tort curtailment. Anyone
of the approved methods, which later turns out to be a wrong selection .... ").
The phrasing of the court's opinion is itself interesting here, as it should of
course be the patient that makes the choice.
61. Slides can be misread, for example. This is not medical malpractice
nor negligence unless a reasonable doctor could not have made such an error.
See Hanks v. Drs. Ransom, Swan & Burch, Ltd., 359 So. 2d 1089 (La. 1978)
(upholding jury verdict of no negligence when frozen section slide of breast
tissue misdiagnosed as malignant, leading to unnecessary mastectomy). See
also Lauro v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 So. 2d 261, 266 (La. App. 1972) ("not
unreasonable" to misdiagnose frozen section tissue sample as cancerous).
62. Brook v. St. John's Hickey Mem'l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind.
1978).
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who sought tort reform was seeking to limit the number or size of
tort suits. These efforts were based on the unproven
presumptions that there were too many lawsuits, that plaintiffs
won too many of them, and that the amounts awarded by juries
were too large. It is perhaps worth pointing out that these
presumptions only represent problems if there are too many
frivolous or unjustified lawsuits, if plaintiffs are winning lawsuits
that they should lose, and if juries are consistently awarding
plaintiffs damages in excess of their injuries. Whatever tort
reform does, it should not be taking away from plaintiffs the
opportunity to file and win justified lawsuits and recover damages
produced by medical negligence.
The fact that the first major medical malpractice crisis
occurred in the 1980s is far from coincidental. As is the case
today, the crisis in the 1980s took the form of wildly escalating
malpractice premiums. If medical malpractice premiums had
gone into their exponential rise in the 1980s because of any
alteration in tort law, it would have had to be a cataclysmic one to
have led to so sudden an increase. No such development in tort
law took place. There was, however, an event in the 1980s that
can be identified as the culprit: economic recession.
During the 1970s, when interest rates were high and
property values were escalating, insurers . . . enjoyed
high returns on their investments .... But in the early
1980s, when the industry was hit by what was then the
sharpest recession since World War II . . . insurers ...
used their monopolistic pricing, and their ability to
manipulate rate-setting procedures, to orchestrate sharp
increases in liability premiums in order to offset their
disappointing investment results. 63
If actual experience in paying claims is not the primary basis
on which premiums are based, then changing the number of
claims filed and the amounts actually paid on them will not have a
.discernible impact on malpractice premiums. As was the case in
the 1980s, there is today no recent change in tort law on which to
pin increased premiums. Expecting changes in tort law to
eliminate the crisis in insurance premiums thus makes little
63. MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 114 (1995).
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sense. If the premiums are set based on factors other than actual
experience paying judgments or defending cases, and there is a lot
of evidence that they are,64 then changing how the tort system
works can have no impact upon them. As one author pointed out
with respect to today's alleged crisis:
Because of the overall surge in malpractice premiums
with no corresponding surge in claims payments during
the last five years, the leading malpractice insurers have
increased their surplus by more than a third in only three
years, and they are now charging more for malpractice
insurance than either their actual payments in
malpractice cases or their estimated future payments in
malpractice cases would justify.6 5
Not surprisingly, then, the tort reforms of the 1980s have not
served to cure the problems, as the current alleged medical
malpractice crisis shows, and changes in the tort system in the
2000s will not help either. Indeed, the very fact that we are in a
crisis situation itself proves that the tort reforms enacted to date
must have been misguided, for if they had not been misguided
they would have helped alleviate the current situation.
Current tort reforms target the perceived problem of excessive
judgments. The syllogism goes like this:
1. Malpractice premiums are based on the claims that
insurance companies pay.
2. Malpractice premiums are too high.
64. See id. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO
INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 44 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov
new.items/d03702.pdf. This GAO study points out a list of factors that
contribute to higher premiums and more inaccessible insurance. See
generally id. While the study maintains that increased payouts play a role in
higher premiums, id. at 15-16, it fails to harmonize this conclusion with the
fact that malpractice insurance crises occur primarily during recessions. If
higher payouts played a major role, it would seem to follow that insurance
crises would be more consistent over time. The fact that insurance crises
follow recessions lends weight to the argument that their primary cause is
not tort law, but rather the economy generally.
65. JAY ANGOFF, FALLING CLAIMS AND RISING PREMIUMS IN THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, ii-iii (Jul. 2005), http://www.centerjd.org/
ANGOFFReport.pdf.
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3. Therefore, we must reduce the claims that insurance
companies pay.
The flaw here is, of course, the assumption that the premiums
are based on experience. There is considerable evidence,
discussed above and below, that they are not. The world of tort
reform seems to operate backwards: the reformers want certain
aspects of the tort system to be changed for whatever reasons, and
because they want these they postulate that the system is broken.
There is no evidence that the tort system, even if broken, is
causing the problems which the reformers purport to target.
A. The Reforms So Far
This article now turns to some of the reforms that tort
reformers have succeeded in persuading legislatures to adopt. No
one questions the presumption that the system is broken in the
first place, nor that these reforms will help with the perceived
crisis. Not surprisingly, because the tort system is not the sole
cause of high medical malpractice insurance premiums, these
reforms inevitably fail to cause their reduction. If the tort system
is not responsible for the insurance premiums that have caused
this latest crisis (and indeed all medical malpractice crises in the
past), then changing the tort system will not protect doctors from
these premiums. Moreover, efforts at reform through the courts
or legislatures by their very failures increase the hatred of doctors
for lawyers. Doctors pin their hopes on hard-won reforms; when
they fail, disappointment and frustration both enter what is
already a shaky relationship between the professions.
Some of the types of reforms that have been tried as vehicles
for alleviating legal pressure on the medical profession are
discussed below. As the current situation of the medical
profession demonstrates, they have almost uniformly failed.
1. Caps on Damages
Caps on damages set a ceiling beyond which the award of
damages, sometimes all damages and sometimes non-economic
damages only, cannot go. Such caps will only solve the apparent
medical malpractice crisis if the crisis is attributable to the large
awards at which this reform is aimed.
Numerous states recognize the increasing costs of medical
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malpractice insurance and the burdens that these rising insurance
costs place on health care providers. 66 In an effort to alleviate
these medical malpractice cost pressures, many jurisdictions have
responded by setting caps on damages awards. 67 In fact, a
majority of states have some type of statutory limit on medical
malpractice damages. 68  These caps come in different forms.
Some states set a ceiling on non-economic damages only, some
limit punitive damages, while other states set caps on all damage
awards. 69 These caps have proven successful in reducing the
amount of payouts by insurers.70  However, they have been
ultimately unsuccessful in lowering malpractice costs because,
while the cost to insurers has gone down, states with caps still
continue to experience rising insurance premiums. Indeed,
insurance premiums in states with caps increased at a rate of
48.2%, while states without caps saw premium increases at a rate
of 35.9%.71 The experience of Texas, which amended its
66. See, e.g., 2004 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 17 (West) ("The [New Jersey]
Legislature finds ... the state's health care system and its residents' access
to health care providers are threatened by a dramatic escalation in medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums. . . ").
67. See, e.g., 2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. 94-677 (West) ("The increasing cost of
medical liability insurance results in increased financial burdens on
physicians and hospitals .... This health care crisis . . . requires significant
reforms .... Limiting non-economic damages is one of these significant
reforms designed to benefit the people of the State of Illinois.").
68. See Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, State Medical Liability Laws
2007, http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/StateMedliablitylaws2007.htm
[hereinafter State Medical Liability Laws] (last visited Jan. 15, 2007) (listing
current statutory requirements of all fifty states regarding limits on damage
awards).
69. Id.
70. MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT
LEVELS, AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE 7 (2003), available at
http://www.WeissRatings.com/MedicalMalpractice.pdf (comparing the median
payouts in states with caps at $98,079 versus the median payouts in states
without caps at $116,927). But see W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born,
Damages Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 72 J. RISK AND INS. 23, 42 (2005) (caps "enhance[d] profitability"
for insurance companies during the studied period).
71. WEISS ET AL., supra note 70, at 7-8 (stating that although the states
with caps had lower median payout rates, their insurance premiums
continued to increase at a rapid pace of 48.2%, while those states without
caps actually experienced slower premium increases at a rate of 35.9%).
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constitution to allow caps on medical malpractice awards, 72 is
illuminating. Proponents of the cap claim success in luring more
doctors to Texas. 73 Those who are more skeptical of the actual
role of caps in this process point out that there was "little increase
in Texas insurance awards from 1990 to 2002, [the twelve years
preceding the enactment of the cap]," and that there is no evidence
supporting the conclusion that the malpractice cap has had the
major impact that its advocates claim for it.74 The fact that
insurance awards did not change between 1990 and 2002 in itself
demonstrates the lack of relevance of caps in the process of easing
the crisis, and the extent to which the crisis was never one of
liability in the first place. As Pennsylvania Governor Edward
Rendell pointed out in a recent statement, the number of doctors
in Pennsylvania has stayed the same in recent years. 75 Governor
Rendell rejected the idea that an unfavorable malpractice climate
had caused doctors to leave the state, arguing that the allegations
of an exodus had been "perpetrated . . .for political purposes."
7 6
Of course, to the extent that the malpractice crisis is political and
not factual, the perception of a cure can gain significance in itself,
a phenomenon with which all doctors are familiar in the form of
the placebo effect. The facts do not bear out either that the
insurance premium problem was caused by tort law in the first
place, or that changes in tort law can fix it.
Caps on damages do not affect the smaller nuisance claims
that insurance companies pay because it remains less expensive to
pay them than to litigate them. They do not affect the vast
majority of claims that fall under the cap. They only have an
impact on claims made by those who are the most profoundly
injured in the most tragic situations-in other words, those who
need the recovery the most.
2. Shortening the Statute of Limitations
Shortening the statute of limitations or abolishing the
72. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b).
73. Ralph Blumenthal, After Texas Caps Malpractice Awards, Doctors
Rush To Practice There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A21.
74. Id.
75. Stacey Burling, Rendell: Medical-Malpractice Crisis Is Over, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Oct. 25, 2007, at C2.
76. Id.
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discovery rule, 77 sometimes precluding suits before the plaintiffs
even know they have been injured, will only help with the crisis if
the longer statutes of limitations or the discovery rule is the
source of the problem. The discovery rule was developed to help
plaintiffs in situations where the negligence of the doctor has been
clear, for example when equipment has been left behind in the
patient after the completion of surgery. Foreclosing suit in such a
situation simply allows a clear act of negligence to go undeterred
and unrecognized, and does not help anyone.
Statutes of limitation are another form of tort curtailment
initiated by the states in order to address rising medical costs. In
fact, every state within the United States has some form of statute
of limitation regarding medical malpractice claims.78  Some
jurisdictions start the tolling of the statute on the actual date of
the injury, in others, statutes start tolling when the injury is
actually discovered, while still other jurisdictions impose a time
limit whether the injury can be reasonably discovered or not. 79
Although all insurance industries have estimated underwriting
cycles, the medical malpractice industry has an especially long lag
time between the time of the actual event and when the claim is
filed.80 Because these prolonged periods equal greater costs for
insurance companies, causing them greater uncertainty about the
scope of their obligations and requiring them to retain reserves for
longer periods, states impose statutes of limitation to shorten the
amount of time for injured parties to file lawsuits.8 1  These
statutes are an attempt to lessen the costs that delayed periods of
uncertainty can have on insurers.82 Statutes of limitation have
proven unsuccessful in cutting malpractice costs. 83  Whether
insurers are saving money due to shorter underwriting cycles or
77. Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury. See Mastro
v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Colo. 1984) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-
105(1) (1983 Supp.) (codifying discovery rule)).
78. See State Medical Liability Laws, supra note 68.
79. Id.
80. Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis'- Recent Trends
and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, available
at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.20vl/DC 1.
81. BUDETrI & WATERS, supra note 9, at 12-13.
82. Id. at 13.
83. See ANGOFF, supra note 65, at 20.
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not, they are not passing savings onto doctors, as insurance
premiums continue to rise.84
3. Requiring an Affidavit
Several states require plaintiffs to provide affidavits signed by
medical professionals, certifying the merit of their medical
malpractice claim, before the case goes to trial.8 5 These signed
affidavits are designed to weed out frivolous lawsuits, thus
decreasing the overall frequency of unmeritorious malpractice
claims.8 6  This reform might seem particularly attractive,
providing a direct disincentive to the filing of non-meritorious
lawsuits. It has not, however, caused a decrease in the number of
claims filed. Although the number of medical malpractice claims
has been rising steadily, so has the number of physicians entering
the medical profession.8 7 When these numbers are taken into
account, the number of malpractice claims has remained relatively
flat over the last several years.8 8 Even though the number of
malpractice claims has remained relatively constant, insurance
premiums have not gone down.89 Actually, medical malpractice
insurers have collected more than double in insurance premiums
while the amount and frequency of their claims has remained
relatively flat.90
4. Regulating Attorneys' Fees
Numerous states have enacted statutes limiting the amount
that attorneys can recover in fees from medical malpractice
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2004) ("[A] plaintiff shall
. . . provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed
person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or
knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is
the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or
occupational standards or treatment practices.").
86. Scaffidi v. Horvitz, 779 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001) ("The essential purpose
of the Affidavit of Merit Statute is 'to weed out frivolous lawsuits at an early
stage' by requiring 'a plaintiff in a malpractice case to make a threshold
showing that the claims asserted are meritorious."' (citing Galik v. Clara
Maass Med. Ctr., 771 A.2d 1141, 1147 (N.J. 2001)).
87. See BUDETT1 & WATERS, supra note 9, at 19-20, 24.
88. See Thorpe, supra note 80.
89. See ANGOFF, supra note 65, at 4.
90. Id.
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awards. 91 Some jurisdictions limit the attorney's compensation to
a percentage of the entire judgment, while others impose limits
based on a sliding scale with the percentage to the attorney
decreasing as the size of the award increases. 92 Jurisdictions with
these statutory limits in place have done so in response to rising
medical malpractice insurance costs. 9 3 Because attorneys receive
a contingency fee (a percentage of the award only if their client
wins), by limiting the percentage that the attorney can claim,
states hope to deter attorneys from filing non-meritorious lawsuits
simply because they promise significant payouts.94 However,
limiting attorneys' medical malpractice fees has not lowered
health care costs for medical providers. 95 Even if attorneys are
now being more selective in the lawsuits they bring, the statutory
limits have not affected insurance prices as premiums continue to
rise.96
5. Panels and Pre-Complaint Screening
One group of reforms has a chance at some success. These are
reforms that require review by an independent and neutral expert
in medicine at some point in the process before the case gets to
discovery and trial. 97 These programs endeavor to filter out
91. See State Medical Liability Laws, supra note 68.
92. Id.
93. See BUDETTI & WATERS, supra note 9, at 9 ("The way that lawyers
representing injured parties are paid in most medical malpractice cases has
also generated a great deal of controversy .... In medical malpractice . . .
lawyers representing patients usually receive a fee only if their client wins
the case. . . . [P]hysicians feel that more often it means that lawyers will
bring cases without merit but involving a seriously injured person simply
because a highly sympathetic victim can lead to an award regardless of the
quality of medical care involved."); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146
(West 2003).
94. See BUDETTI & WATERS, supra note 9, at 9; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6146 (West 2003).
95. See ANGOFF, supra note 65, at 20.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 231, § 60B (2006) ("Every action for
malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health care shall be heard
by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of the superior court, a physician
licensed to practice medicine in the commonwealth . . . and an attorney
authorized to practice law in the commonwealth .... Each such action for
malpractice shall be heard by said tribunal within fifteen days after the
defendant's answer has been filed.").
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unmeritorious claims, thus reducing litigation costs and the risks
involved for defendants in taking cases to trial. In Massachusetts,
for example, in order to bring an action for medical malpractice,
the claim must first be presented to a tribunal consisting of a
superior court justice, physician, and attorney.98 The plaintiff
bears the burden of proof in front of the tribunal, and must show
that there is sufficient evidence for the claim to go to court. 99 If
the Massachusetts tribunal finds that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain an adequate legal claim, then the plaintiff must file a
six thousand dollar bond in order to pursue the case.100 While it
is too early to predict possible success, these reforms bring
medical professionals into the case at an earlier point in time than
the others, and perhaps for that reason might succeed in reducing
the number of nonmeritorious cases that are filed.
6. The Problem of Legislative Involvement
Most of the reforms discussed above were enacted into law by
state legislatures. Not surprisingly, most of the legislators lack
medical training. Equally unsurprisingly, legislatures are heavily
lobbied, and by none more thoroughly than the insurance
industry.' 0 ' Legislatures love to get involved in the tort system,
though-particularly medical torts. They can look like they are
doing something to solve what has been sold to them as a problem
with tort judgments that are excessive in both number and
amount. But do the legislatures help?
First and foremost, is the tort system broken? There is a lot
of evidence that it is not, and that tort judgments have little to do
with malpractice insurance crises. The idea that they do itself
causes harm, because it further inflames doctors against lawyers.




101. The Health Insurance Association of America is one of the top 100
lobbying organizations. LobbyWatch: The Top 100 Companies and
Organizations,
http://www.openairwaves.org/lobby/top.aspx?act=topcompanies (last visited
Nov. 13, 2007). The organization spent $29,510,000 between 1998 and 2004.
LobbyWatch: Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA),
http://www.openairwaves.org/lobby/profile.aspx?act=clients&year=2003&cl=L
011906 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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belief that the tort system is the source of the problems they
confront with malpractice insurance. Then, when the requested
reforms of the tort system fail to produce any relief, they become
even more outraged at the system, and hate lawyers even more.
The reason why the so-called reforms do not solve any problems is
that the reforms are not directed at the real source of physician
discomfort: insurance.
B. The Reforms the System Needs
The above section discusses some of the common reforms that
legislatures have so far enacted. It is perhaps worth pointing out
that many of them have already been enacted in many
jurisdictions, but they were completely unable to abate the current
crisis. The reason is that they were not aimed at the correct
target. If they had been, they would have worked and future
crises, like the one now, would have been avoided.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to detail the
reforms that might truly serve to reduce inappropriate tort
liability (if there is any), there are several kinds of reforms that
might be worth pursuing. The reforms that might help would be
directed at the real problems created by the intersection of
medicine and the law. These include reforms directed at the
inequality of standards for professional malpractice between the
professions and reforms that would make the legal approach to
medicine more scientifically rational.
Reforms directed at the double standard for malpractice
between the legal and medical professions would require that the
law be willing to be judged by the same criteria that doctors now
face. Informed consent, for example, would look the same,
whether involving a patient or a client. There is no analytical
reason why informed consent should not apply equally to both
professions. This particular reform might produce the unintended
dividend of improving attorney/client relationships in general, as
well as improving medicine's view of the law. It might also, of
course, lead legislatures, with their lawyer-heavy memberships, to
curtail all malpractice liability, be it legal or medical. This could
not happen without compelling legislatures at the least to confront
the malpractice system as a whole, and potentially even improve
its operation and fairness to all parties, not just defendants.
A second source of reform lies in changing the insurance
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industry. The insurance industry must be regulated in such a
way that any reduction in judgments is passed through to those
who buy premiums. Medical malpractice premiums should not be
used to make up for investments that produce less in times of
recession, but should rather depend on experience. If medical
malpractice crises are caused not by judgments nor by increased
negligence, but rather by premium-setting practices, these
reforms should be the most effective of all. These reforms will be
hard to attain in the face of the insurance agency's massive
lobbying expenditures, 102 but they have possibly the greatest
chance of success.
Finally, another source of reforms would be those that would
make the intersection between the legal and medical professions
more scientifically viable. The lost chance doctrine is an example
of a modern legal doctrine that, if expanded, has the potential to
make the juncture between law and medicine both more
scientifically and legally defensible. Under the usual rule in tort
cases, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was responsible for his or her injury. A
plaintiff who meets this standard will win 100% of his or her
damages, even if the evidence shows that the defendant was
barely over 50% responsible for the injury. It follows from this
that a plaintiff who shows that the defendant was 50%
responsible, minus a fraction, recovers nothing. 1° 3
The preponderance of the evidence standard makes little
sense in the medical context with respect to cases where the
doctor was less than 50% responsible for the injury. With respect
to situations when the plaintiff cannot meet the preponderance of
the evidence standard, but can show that the defendant cost the
plaintiff some statistically provable chance at recovery, courts
sometimes use the lost chance doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
doctor may be sued for costing the patient an increased chance of
survival. In Herskovitz v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, for
example, the patient had a 25% chance of survival after the
doctor's negligence, but would have had a 39% chance of survival
had the doctor not been negligent. 10 4 The doctor's negligence cost
102. Id.
103. Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 46-47 (Mich. 1990).
104. See Herskovitz v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474,
479 (Wash. 1983).
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the plaintiff a significant percentage of his chance of survival, but
considerably less than 50%. The court noted that ruling in the
defendant's favor because the plaintiff could not meet the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof "would be a blanket
release from liability for doctor and hospitals any time there was
less than a 50% chance of survival."'10 5
How does this expansion of medical liability beyond the
preponderance of the evidence standard help the medical
profession? Under a preponderance of the evidence system, the
plaintiff would have lost the case and collected nothing, while
under the lost chance doctrine the plaintiff collects damages. But
if one turns the analysis around, something it has apparently not
occurred to the courts to do, the result could end up being far more
equitable and scientifically sensible to doctors than first appears.
If the doctor was negligent and the plaintiff can meet the
preponderance of the evidence standard by showing that there is a
greater than 50% chance that the doctor's negligence caused the
injury, why shouldn't the same rule operate to reduce the damages
the doctor pays? Under the preponderance of the evidence system,
the plaintiff will collect 100% of his or her damages, even if the
evidence shows that there was a 49% chance that the damages
would not have occurred in the absence of negligence. There
should be a tradeoff: in exchange for the doctor being liable for
less than 50% of the damages in some cases, the doctor should also
be liable for less than 100% of the damages in cases where the
doctor caused less than 100% of the damages. This would
probably be most medical malpractice cases, and might lead not
only to a reduction in verdicts across the board but also to a
system that more reliably reflects scientific reality than the one
we have now.
Extending the lost chance doctrine to all cases of medical
harm represents a true reform in tort law, one that could make
the concept of causation in tort law match scientific causation to a
greater extent than the all-or-nothing approach to causation is
capable of doing. It could lead to substantial reductions in
judgments, as the amounts of any judgments would match the
percentage of responsibility for the injury caused by any medical
105. Id. at 477; see also Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 56-57 (loss of 37.5% chance
of survival).
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negligence that occurred. This percentage would rarely be 100%,
as numerous other factors are likely to have contributed to the end
result.
There are other types of reforms of the legal system in
addition to the lost chance doctrine that provide at least a start in
bringing science and the law together. The law needs more fully
to recognize scientific exigency, and, in order to be fair to those it
judges, adjust its system to reflect medicine more accurately. Jury
instructions could be drafted with the assistance of scientific
experts that would more reliably convey the realities of medical
practice to the jury, providing a basis for decision that would draw
closer to reality. Changing the standard through jury instructions
would allow the direct and cross examinations of expert witness to
follow the needs of science, not of certainty.
CONCLUSION
It is beyond argument that doctors feel unfairly burdened by
the legal profession. They are to a large extent justified. The
absence of success to date in alleviating the burden on doctors
proves that the reforms beloved by those who would curtail tort
liability and doctrine are aimed at the wrong target. Thus, they
cannot succeed. But this lack of success is not only problematic
for that reason: the lack of success itself causes harm. Doctors,
persuaded that lawyers are the source of their problems, see the
lack of success in the so-called reforms, and blame the legal
profession even more. Promises of relief go unfulfilled, leading to
the decline of the false hopes generated by the reforms as an
initial matter. True reform involves looking more deeply into the
sources of friction between the legal and medical professions. This
article has attempted to take such an approach. The reforms it
has suggested are fundamental and involve the legal profession
taking a good hard look at itself. The tort system is not broken,
and true change must go far beyond the band-aid approach that
has thus far failed to alleviate the tensions between our two great
professions.
